Abstract
I. Introduction
Research into wireless sensor networks, as well as the applications that employ this technology that are already in place, show that they are a favorable method for solving problems or enhancing existing systems. They can be used for a wide range of functions from monitoring patients while not at the doctor's office to sensing environmental conditions such as the level of pollutants in a given area. Since many wireless sensor networks are utilized in applications where the data gathered is confidential, security has become a critical issue. However, finding an efficient solution to this issue is easier said than done for a variety of reasons. Implementing any form of security measures onto the sensor nodes requires the use of resources that are already constrained in these networks [1, 2] .
The sensor nodes are designed with the goals of being small, in order to be utilized in different environments, and relatively cheap so that many nodes can be deployed in the testing environments. This has lead to these sensors having constraints in terms of low computation, memory, and power available. A good portion of the memory is already needed for the code that runs on the sensors that dictates to them what conditions to sense, when to sense the conditions, etc. Additional code that is required to implement any algorithm needs to fall within the range of the provided memory minus the existing code memory. Increasing the resources on the sensor nodes is not a viable solution if the goals mentioned above or the general operating efficiency of the network are sacrificed.
The objective of any security method being utilized is to maintain authentication, secrecy, and data integrity within the network.
Authentication involves the receiver of a packet being able to validate that the alleged sender is in fact the real sender and that it is a valid node of the network.
Secrecy (a.k.a. confidentiality) deals with making sure that the data sent is not received by unintended parties. Data integrity ensures that the data received is the same as the data that was sent.
Different types of attacks on wireless sensor networks focus on exploiting the resource constraints to cripple one of the three parameters listed above [3] . An attacker can passively eavesdrop on the communication occurring within the network. By doing so, any of the sensitive information that is being sensed by the nodes will be available to the listening party. For a more active assault, a malicious party could inject false packets into the network that would be perceived as valid information by the other nodes. With selective forwarding attacks, the compromised node drops certain packets from the network instead of forwarding them along the data path like it should. This also ties up network resources that could have been used for legitimate packets. An attacker might also alter the contents of a valid packet, which undermines the authentication and data integrity of the network.
Most security algorithms employ some form of cryptography where data is encoded and then decoded by the base stations and sensor nodes of the wireless sensor network [4] . Cryptography allows for authentication, secrecy, and data integrity to be maintained within the network. However, the security of many of the algorithms degrades when one or more nodes have been compromised [5, 6] . This is because the adversary now has the cryptography keys that were used by a legitimate node. The rest of the network would not be able to identify the malicious node from a valid node if there are not additional security measures included in the network. An intrusion detection system, whose function is to detect attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities or flaws within a given network, could be utilized in this situation [7] .
Most security algorithms are generally classified into two main types: misuse intrusion detection (MID) and anomaly-based intrusion detection (AID). Both kinds strive for the same characteristics of a 100% attack detection rate and a 0% false positive rate. A false positive occurs when a legitimate node is identified as an intruder. For obvious reasons, this is detrimental to the integrity of the system. MID systems work under the concept that the attacks that plague a network exhibit certain unique characteristics that can form a signature for said attack. The individual attacks are introduced onto the network and studied in order to look for patters with which to identify the attack. While the network is deployed, it is constantly being monitored for activity that matches any of the signatures. The problem with this type of IDS is that unknown attacks can pass through undetected.
In AID systems, the assumption is that the intruder's behavior deviates from the normal network behavior. In this type of IDS, each sensor node will be monitoring its neighbors to keep track of the normal behavior for a given set of parameters. Any node that strays from its standard actions will trigger an alarm in its neighbors. The disadvantage of this type of IDS is that there is a high false positive rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. The new algorithm to detect compromised sensor nodes is introduced in Section III. Simulation results and analysis are provided in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. Related Work

A. Localization Based Anomaly Detection
Many wireless sensor networks utilize a GPS system to gather data regarding the location of the sensor nodes. In large sensor networks, providing each node with GPS capability might be too expensive; instead, many times beacon nodes, which have a GPS receiver, are implemented. These beacon nodes will know their own location, and the other sensor nodes use these nodes to figure out their own location in the network.
Du, Ning, and Liu published a paper presenting a way to detect malicious beacon nodes [8] . They reasoned that it would be difficult for a compromised beacon node to get away with sending beacon signals with the wrong location information. This is because the location and beacon signal sent by the malicious beacon node will both have to be falsified. Beacon nodes in the network are given a set of node ID's and keys that allows them to communicate with the other beacon nodes of the network while appearing to be a non-beacon node. Compromised nodes are detected when a valid beacon node gets a beacon signal from a malicious beacon node whose estimated location based off the beacon signal is different from the location given by the beacon signal. Attacks using locally replayed beacon signals are discovered since it is difficult for the compromised beacon node to achieve the expected round trip time for communication between neighboring nodes.
B. Network/Neighbor Stability Based Anomaly Detection
Onat and Miri developed an intrusion detection system (IDS) by exploiting certain characteristics of the sensor nodes, like their stable neighborhood information [9] . The sensor network they set up took the communication to be a many-to-one arrangement, which is where the sensor nodes send their information to a single or fixed destination along paths that are more or less stable. Therefore, the HELLO flood packets that nodes use to identify their neighbors would not be needed throughout the lifetime of the network. It was assumed that new nodes did not appear in the network after initial deployment and that the nodes were not mobile. Also, there were thought to be no changes in transmission power levels. Every node in the network had the ability to distinctively identify its neighboring nodes. Each node used the same hardware and same algorithm stack running on it. The clocks running on one node was not assumed to be synchronized with the other nodes.
Given the stability of the network that was assumed, the sensors should know what to expect from their neighbors.
To further exploit this concept, two parameters were chosen from the sensor network on which to store information regarding their neighbors. The parameters chosen were the packet arrival rate in units of packets per unit time and the average receive power in units of dBm. A buffer containing a predetermined number of packets is maintained in this algorithm. These packets are used to calculate the range of acceptable values of packet arrival rate and receive power for subsequent packets. If the received values for these parameters do not fall in range that is being constantly updated, an intrusion is detected. IDS relied on the nodes to inform neighboring nodes of its findings regarding a possible intruder in the network. If a node hears these intruder messages from a set number of its neighbors, it flags the suspected node as compromised.
C. SoftWare-based ATTestation for Embedded Devices
A different approach to detecting compromised nodes involves using code attestation to validate the actual program code running on the sensor nodes. Hardware-based methods of attestation exist where a secure coprocessor is utilized to check the memory contents of the embedded device in question. Seshadri, Perrig, Doorn, and Khosla created a SoftWare-based ATTestation technique (SWATT), a code attestation algorithm that is executed solely through software means [10] .
Their technique was designed with the intention of creating a method to externally verify the code running on embedded devices. A trusted verifier is the key component in achieving this goal of their algorithm. The malicious node will contain at least one line of code that is different from the expected code running on normal sensors. The verifier has a copy of the memory contents residing in uncompromised nodes. The verifier sends a "challenge" to the node, which it uses as the input to a pseudo-random generator to create random memory addresses [10] . A checksum is performed in the device on each of these memory addresses. The verifier runs the same verification procedure locally to compute the expected value of the checksum. This expected value is compared to the value returned by the node in question.
A compromised node that has altered the memory contents would have to discern whether each memory location created by the pseudo-random generator has been changed. For the proposed SWATT method to perform well enough to be used in wireless sensor networks, the additional time needed to perform this check and run the verification procedure should be noticeable to the verifier. The authors chose to run their experiments on a simulator contained in AVR studio version 4.0. Their results showed that difference in time to compute the checksum becomes more prominent as the number of memory locations accessed increases.
In this paper, the same assumptions in the work done by Onat and Mari will be made regarding the sensor network. Changes were made to the process of determining whether a node is compromised or not. The base station, which will be assumed to be a trusted party, will play a larger role in identifying compromised nodes. The base station is alerted to the presence of a potential compromised node and uses code attestation to verify the possible threat. The idea mentioned in the SWATT research that a compromised node has to do something different compared to the legitimate nodes of the network was an important concept utilized in the algorithm designed.
III. ALGORITHM
The following assumptions were made while designing the algorithm: 1) nodes are stationary once the network has been deployed, 2) new nodes are not added to the network after deployment, 3) sensor node clocks are not synchronized, 4) base station will have node_id = 0, and 5) all sensor nodes (except the base station) have the same hardware and software. The following notation and pseudocode provides a basic idea of how the algorithm works. (low_value) calculated for max_buffer_packets. Enough time was given to the nodes to get these values for N neighbors. Each node of the network also keeps a buffer than contains the last X transmission times of the packets it sent.
Notation For Sensor Nodes
During the second part, the compromised nodes are introduced into the network. A compromised node is one that is performing some function that is different from those seen on legitimate nodes. In this paper, these nodes were set to perform the selective forwarding attack. The detection scheme works as follows. If the arrival_time of the packet node B sends to node A does not fall within the high_value and low_value that A has stored for B, node A sends an ALERT message to the base station. The base station then asks node B for its transmission_time_buffer [X] . If these values are not consistent, the base station labels node B as compromised. The base station will then send a broadcast message informing the nodes of the network to the presence of the intruder. Once a sensor node receives this message, two things happen. First, it clears out any entry it has in its packet arrival time buffer for the intruder. Second, it adds the node id of the intruder to compromised[], which allows the node to cease all communication with the malicious party.
However, if the base station sees that the transmission times of node B are consistent, it informs node A that node B is not compromised. Node A will then update its high or low value in the arrival_time_buffer[N] for node B accordingly. By making the sensors update these values, the number of ALERT message sent to the base station is decreased, which decreases the number of packets injected into the network by the algorithm.
The base station plays an important role in the algorithm designed. It is a trusted entity by all nodes of the network, which allows the base station to verify whether a node is compromised or not and for all the sensors to automatically accept this decision. Therefore, the base station is assumed to be an uncompromised node throughout the network lifetime. In this algorithm, it would be ideal if the base station has a higher processing speed than the other nodes since it either sends or receives all the packets involved with the detection part of the algorithm.
IV. Simulations
The TinyOS simulator TOSSIM was chosen to simulate the designed algorithm for detecting compromised nodes in a wireless sensor network. To begin the simulation process, there were several parameters altered for different runs to determine what kind of effect they had. The number of neighbors each node has was determined by using the following equation (Z % 10) + 1 where Z is the number of nodes in the network. The number of packets used for the packet arrival time buffer was experimented on and the results showed that this particular value did not have much of an effect unless a high value was chosen. A larger number meant that the initialization phase would last much longer than intended. Therefore 10 packets was the chosen value for each simulation regardless of the network size. The number of values to be stored in the transmission time buffer was kept at a constant value of 5 for all simulation runs. This is because all legitimate nodes send packets every 3 seconds. The transmission time buffer for compromised nodes would not have consistent values, so a higher number was not needed. The number of compromised nodes to be introduced onto the network equaled to the network size modulo 10. All compromised were injected around at same time for each network size. The larger networks needed more time in the initialization phase which meant the larger the network, the more time before compromised nodes were introduced.
The simulations were run until either all compromised nodes were found or a problem was discovered. While TOSSIM is one of the easier simulators to use due to its low level of complexity compared to other available tools, this also adds a level of difficulty when trying to collect results. Several times, results had to be thrown out due to a simulator error (not a user error), where, for instance, the compromised nodes were never introduced into the network. Also, in wireless sensor networks where base stations are utilized, they usually have a higher computational and memory capacity compared to the sensor nodes. However, a setting or option was not found to make a more powerful node in the network. Figure 1 shows the average time it takes for all intruders to be found after they have been introduced into the network. The smaller networks take less time than the larger networks for two main reasons. The obvious reason is that there are more compromised nodes in the larger networks, so more times is needed to find all of them. The second reason is that there is more traffic generated in the larger networks, so it takes longer for the base station to process all the requests. While TOSSIM should simulate all nodes at once, there was a definite time increase noticed to send packets as the network size increased. Figure 2 shows the average number of packets sent by a compromised node once it has been injected into the network. Remember here that the number of compromised nodes is dependent on the network size. For example, the network with 40 nodes will include 4 compromised nodes. The algorithm works efficiently since only a few packets at most are sent compared to the hundreds of valid packets. To get an idea of the ratio, the total number of packets sent in the 20 node network was 1825.67 packets, and the average number of compromised packets sent was 1.5. This means the number of packets sent by the compromised nodes made up on average 0.0822% of all traffic. Once the malicious party is found, any further communication with the compromised node is discontinued and any packets received from said party are ignored. As mentioned earlier, false positives are often a problem when dealing with intrusion detection systems. False positives occur when a valid node is labeled as a compromised node in the network. When the number of false positives increases, the efficiency of the algorithm decreases significantly. In this algorithm, the trusted base station takes care of this problem since there were no false positives. In other words, a valid node was never identified as a compromised node by the base station. Figure 3 shows the number of false positives that were prevented by the base station. 
V. Conclusions
We have presented an algorithm to detect the compromised nodes in wireless sensor networks. The algorithm is based on the anomaly-based intrusion detection technique.
It uses the event-driven characteristics of sensor networks to verify whether a node is sending packets in fixed time intervals. The base station is alerted to claims of abnormal behavior and verifies them by checking the difference in packet transmission times of the suspected node. Efficiency and accuracy are two primary metrics in designing the algorithm. Simulations are conducted to demonstrate both performance metrics. We believe that a base station that has more computation and power resources would further decrease the detection time.
